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The general equilibrium model with incomplete ﬁnancial markets
(GEI) is extended by adding ﬁat money, ﬁscal and monetary policy
and a cash-in-advance constraint. The central bank either pegs the
interest rate or money supply while the ﬁscal authority sets a Ricardian
or a non-Ricardian ﬁscal plan. We prove the existence of equilibria in
all four scenarios. In Ricardian economies, the conditions required
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11 Introduction
In this paper we extend the standard general equilibrium model with in-
complete ﬁnancial markets by introducing ﬁat money and adding a public
authority. The latter consists of a ﬁscal and a monetary authority. The
ﬁscal authority sets a ﬁscal plan consisting of taxes, nominal transfers and
a debt policy. The monetary authority, or the central bank, creates ﬁat
money at zero costs and earns seignorage from its monetary policy. The ac-
tions of both authorities are linked by a common public budget constraint.
The transactions technology is supposed to be a simple cash-in-advance con-
straint. If the nominal interest rates are positive, non-interest bearing ﬁat
money is dominated as a store of value by an interest-bearing nominal bond.
The demand for money comes from its role to facilitate trade by means of
the cash-in-advance constraint within the states of the economy.
As argued in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (See, e.g., Woodford
1995), the introduction of a government which has to meet some budget
constraint might add additional restrictions on the set of equilibria. It is
well understood that this possibility depends on whether the ﬁscal policy
is of the Ricardian or the non-Ricardian type. Following Woodford (2001),
a ﬁscal policy is called Ricardian if the government budget is satisﬁed for
every price vector. If the budget is valid only for some prices, it is called
non-Ricardian. In the latter case, the government budget constraint adds
additional restrictions on the equilibrium set.1
We study four important combinations of ﬁscal and monetary policies
by combining nominal interest rate peg and money supply policy of the
central bank with a Ricardian and a non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy. For all these
cases, we prove existence of an equilibrium and characterize its determinacy
properties.
If the ﬁscal authority follows a Ricardian policy, there exist monetary
competitive equilibria under assumptions which are close to the standard
assumptions in GEI with ﬁnancial assets. As in the standard GEI model
without a central bank and a ﬁscal authority, the equilibrium in this Ricar-
dian framework is not determinate. More precisely, there exists a monetary
equilibrium under a Ricardian ﬁscal rule for every ﬁxed positive price level
1The idea that a non-Ricardian policy might lead to a determinate equilibrium ﬁrst
appeared in Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992). They formally prove the generic local unique-
ness under a particular non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy.
2and for every ﬁxed equivalent martingale measure. This result is true for
both interest rate peg and money supply policy. Under interest rate peg,
we argue that the indeterminacy of the price level is purely nominal but the
indeterminacy of the martingale measure can be expected to be real since
markets are incomplete. Under money supply control, we conjecture that
the indeterminacy of the price level might also be real.
If the ﬁscal authority follows a non-Ricardian policy, existence of equi-
librium requires more restrictive assumptions as compared to the Ricardian
case. Loosely speaking, the existence of equilibrium requires either high
enough gains to trade or positive tax returns. The intuition is that if the
ﬁscal authority ﬁxes nominal transfers at some predetermined and positive
level, it must earn seignorage or tax returns to be able to balance its bud-
get. If taxes are zero, then the gains to trade in the economy must be large
enough to induce some positive seigniorage income for the government. To
make this argument precise, we use the measure for the gains to trade in-
troduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992, 2003a).
Importantly, every obvious degree of indeterminacy we found in the Ri-
cardian economy is lost if we assume that the government trades riskless
bonds only. Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006) provide a formal proof for
generic local uniqueness of equilibria under such a ﬁscal policy. This result
illustrates the role of ﬁscal policy for the determinacy of the equilibrium.
The main contributions of this paper to the recent literature are the
following. First, we show existence and characterize indeterminacy in a
cash-in-advance economy with incomplete ﬁnancial market systems and a
Ricardian ﬁscal policy.2 Our results extend the previous ﬁndings on exis-
tence and indeterminacy in Dr´ eze and Polemarchakis (2000), Bloise, Dr´ eze
and Polemarchakis (2005), Bloise (2006) and Nakajima and Polemarchakis
(2005) under complete markets to incomplete markets. Under a particu-
lar non-Ricardian policy, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003(b)) prove existence
of general competitive equilibria under both interest rate peg and money
supply control with incomplete markets. They use a strategic market game
approach to derive their results. The second contribution of our paper is
to provide an alternative proof of existence in a non-Ricardian model. Our
method to prove existence adopts more traditional techniques of general
2After completing the ﬁrst draft of this paper, we learned that Gourdel and Triki
(2005) independently studied a similar economy under interest rate peg. They obtain
results similar to our Theorems 1 and 3. We will comment on this in Sections 3.3 and 4.3.
3equilibrium analysis, and does not rely on a market game analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the monetary
economy including the government and deﬁne the general equilibrium. In
Section 3, we present our main results for a Ricardian economy, including
both interest rate peg and money supply policy. In Section 4, we provide a
parallel result for a non-Ricardian economy. In Section 5 we conclude the
paper and give the proofs of all results in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The economy
We study an exchange economy which extends over two dates, the present
time t = 0 and the future t = 1. The present is known with certainty,
but at date 1 there are S possible states of nature which we index with
s 2 S = f1;:::;Sg. Including the present, there are S + 1 states of nature
lying in the set S¤ := f0;1;:::;Sg. At every s 2 S¤ there are L consumption
goods which are indexed with l = 1;:::;L and traded at spot prices psl. We
denote a consumption plan at state s 2 S¤ with xs = (xs1;:::;xsL) 2 RL
+,
an overall consumption plan with x = (x0;:::;xs;:::;xS) 2 R
(S+1)L
+ , a
price vector at state s 2 S¤ with ps = (ps1;:::;psL) 2 RL
+ and an overall
price vector with p = (p0;:::;ps;:::;pS) 2 R
(S+1)L
+ . All commodities are
perishable.
In t = 0, there are asset markets for J · S ﬁnancial contracts indexed
with j = 1;:::;J. Each asset is a promise to deliver V
j
s 2 R+ units of
money in every state s 2 S and is traded at price qj in period zero. The
ﬁrst asset is assumed to be a nominal riskless government bond. There is
no default and each risky ﬁnancial asset is in zero net supply. Denote the
S £ J-matrix of returns with V , the S £ (J ¡ 1)-matrix of the returns of
the risky assets with A, the 1 £ J-vector of asset prices with qV and the
1 £ (J ¡ 1) -vector of asset prices excluding the price of the bond with q.
The price of the one period nominal bond between t = 0 and t = 1 is 1
1+r0,
where r0 is the nominal interest rate between t = 0 and t = 1.
We will assume that, within every node s 2 S¤, the asset markets open
before the commodity markets and on the commodity markets, a household
receives the revenues from selling endowments at the end of the respective
node. Therefore, in every state s 2 S in t = 1, a nominal riskfree bond can
4again be traded to allow agents to borrow against their income which they
receive at the end of this period. However, there is no uncertainty involved
at this stage, i.e. each state s 2 S has only one successor state and this state
serves for accounting purposes only. The date of these successor states is
called accounting period. The price of a bond traded in state s 2 S is 1
1+rs,
where rs is the nominal interest rate between state s 2 S and the accounting
period.
In addition, there is ﬁat money which can also be held as a store of value
between t = 0 and t = 1 and between t = 1 and the accounting period. We
impose the following general assumption on the structure of the ﬁnancial
assets:
Assumption 1 rank(V ) = J · S. There exists a riskfree asset at each
s 2 S¤.
2.2 The households
The economy is populated by a ﬁnite set I := f1;:::;Ig of households. At
t = 0, the asset markets open ﬁrst. On this market, the household trades
money ni
0 2 R+, riskfree government bonds bi
0 2 R and a portfolio of risky
assets µi 2 RJ¡1. In addition, household i receives a (lump-sum) transfer
±iH0 from the government, where H0 2 R+ is the aggregate transfer from





+ q ¢ µi + ni
0 = ±iH0; (1)
where 1
1+r0 is the price of the nominal bond. In the goods markets, which
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+ q ¢ µi + mi
0 = ±iH0 + p0 ¢ ei
0: (4)
3We use the usual deﬁnition of the negative and the positive part of a vector: x
+ :=
(:::;maxfxi;0g;:::) and x
¡ := (:::;maxf¡xi;0g;:::) so that x = x
+ ¡ x
¡.
5Equation (4) is the familiar ﬂow budget constraint, which says that the total
expenditure within one period cannot exceed the total wealth.
From (2) and (3), we get an equivalent formulation of the cash-in-advance
constraint as
mi
0 ¸ p0 ¢ (xi
0 ¡ ei
0)¡: (5)
We will use this formulation for the transactions technology because it turns
out to be more convenient.
Household i 2 I pays a tax ¿i
s in state s 2 S¤. The tax is speciﬁed as the
market value of a vector of commodities, ¿i
s 2 RL
+, i.e. its budgetary impact
is ps ¢ ¿i
s. The payment of these taxes occurs at the end of state s 2 S¤ in
question.
Denoting household i0s quantity of a bond traded at the beginning of
state s 2 S in t = 1 with bi
s and the transfer to household i in state s 2 S











0; 8s 2 S: (6)
The cash-in-advance constraint is
mi
s ¸ ps ¢ (xi
s ¡ ei
s)¡; 8s 2 S: (7)
In the accounting period following t = 1, the only economic activity
is the payment of the debt and of the income tax in state s 2 S, ps ¢ ¿i
s.
Therefore, the terminal condition is
0 · bi
s + mi
s ¡ ps ¢ ¿i
s; 8s 2 S: (8)
In the optimal choice, this condition will hold as an equality.
For each i 2 I, deﬁne ei := (ei
s)s2S¤, ¿i := (¿i
s)s2S¤, mi := (mi
s)s2S¤ and
bi := (bi








(4) ¡ (8) hold
o
:
Every household i 2 I gets utility from consuming in every node
s 2 S¤ according to a function ui : R
(S+1)L
+ ! R. We make the follow-
ing assumptions on the household sector:
4To save the notation, we suppress the parameters in the notation. The budget set
should always be understood as B







6Assumption 2 For each consumer i, the utility function ui is continuous,
quasi-concave and strictly increasing.
Assumption 3 Every household has some endowments after tax in every






> 0 for every s 2 S¤. Household one has strictly











At each state s 2 S¤, the government taxes the household and distributes






s. The total lump-sum transfer is the vector H :=
(Hs)s2S¤ 2 RS+1
+ . For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that the
transfer is distributed according to the shares (±i)i2I,
P
i ±i = 1.
The government trades riskfree bonds B = (Bs)s2S¤ and supplies bal-
ances M = (Ms)s2S¤. If Bs > 0 then the government sells bonds and hence
the term represents new indebtedness against the private sector. If Bs < 0,
it means the loan to the private sector.
Assumption 4 The government only trades riskless bonds.
This assumption can be justiﬁed by an appeal to realism. It has con-
sequences for the determinacy of equilibria. We will comment on this in
Section 4.3.
It follows that the government budget constraint is
B0
1 + r0
+ M0 = H0 (9)
in period zero and
Bs
1 + rs
+ Ms + p0 ¢ ¿0 = B0 + M0 + Hs; 8s 2 S (10)
in period one.
In general, the ﬁscal policy consists of a plan for taxes, transfers and bond
market actions.6 However, in this paper we keep the taxes ﬁxed and restrict
5A vector x 2 R
n satisﬁes x > 0 if and only if xi ¸ 0, 8i = 1;:::;n, and if there is a j
such that xj > 0. Accordingly, x À 0 if and only if xi > 0, 8i = 1;:::;n and x ¸ 0 if and
only if xi ¸ 0, 8i = 1;:::;n.
6We emphasize that taxes are only included to make the model more general. Not a
single argument, neither related to the existence of a monetary equilibrium nor related to
the (in)determinacy, depends on strictly positive taxes.
7attention to diﬀerent transfer policies in combination with bond market
actions. Subject to this restriction we will study four diﬀerent combinations
of ﬁscal and monetary policy of the government: the central bank might peg
the interest rate or ﬁx the money supply, while the ﬁscal authority might
determine transfers endogenously or ﬁx them exogenously.
We restrict attention to the following structure. In the case of endoge-
nous transfers, the ﬁscal authority redistributes the seigniorage income and
the tax returns at each state of the economy. The government bonds adjust
accordingly to satisfy the constraints of the government. Bloise and Pole-
marchakis (2006) call such a policy a balanced transfer rule. We adopt their
terminology and say that the ﬁscal policy follows a balanced transfer rule if
it satisﬁes the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 The balanced transfer ﬁscal policy determines the vector (H;B)







; 8s 2 S¤;
Bs (p;M;r) := ps¿s ¡ Ms; 8s 2 S¤:
The balanced transfer rule says that the government distributes its revenue
in every state of the world. Hence the government needs to know the value
of its seigniorage and the market value of its tax returns at the time when
the transfers are distributed, i.e. in the ﬁrst subperiod within a state since
the transfers occur in the asset markets.7
This ﬁscal policy satisﬁes the inequality
Bs + Ms ¡ ps ¢ ¿s ¸ 0; 8s 2 S; (11)
which is an admissibility condition for every equilibrium. Indeed, at the end
of each state s 2 S, the outstanding money supply Ms must be suﬃcient
to enable the private sector to pay its taxes and debt service obligations (if
Bs < 0) to the government (if Bs > 0, to pay the excess of taxes over the
7Since commodity prices are determined on commodity markets which, however, meet
when the asset markets are already closed, the speciﬁcation of such a policy involves
an informational problem. Perhaps the most consistent interpretation is, ﬁrst, that the
asset and the commodity markets in fact meet at the same time but at diﬀerent places
and, second, that the possible money ﬂow is restricted to the direction from the asset
to the commodity markets. The ﬁrst point implies that the government can observe the
commodity prices for determining its policy, hence resolving the informational problem.
The second point implies that the households can use their asset market funds in the
commodity markets, as required.
8government’s debt service). Obviously, the balanced transfer ﬁscal policy
not only satisﬁes (11), but it even satisﬁes
Bs + Ms ¡ ps ¢ ¿s = 0; 8s 2 S: (12)
A little reﬂection shows that without this equation, there would be no equi-
librium. In fact, because preferences are monotone, households choose their






s ¡ ps ¢ ¿i
s
¢
= 0 for all s 2 S. Since market clearing requires
P
i2I bi
s = Bs and
P
i2I mi
s = Ms, one gets (12). A ﬁscal policy which fails
to provide for the possibility for (12) holding as an equation would not be
compatible with equilibrium.
A ﬁscal policy which ﬁxes transfers in every state of the world exoge-
nously will be called ﬁxed transfer ﬁscal policy. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2 The ﬁxed transfer ﬁscal policy determines the vector (H;B)
by the functions H (p;M;r) and B (p;M;r), where
Hs (p;M;r) := Hs;8s 2 S¤; where H0 > 0;Hs ¸ 0;8s 2 S;





Bs (p;M;r) := (1 + rs)(B0 + M0 + Hs ¡ Ms ¡ p0 ¢ ¿0); 8s 2 S:
Importantly, notice that under this policy the equation (12) does not hold
for some price and interest rate vector.
An alternative approach would postulate (12) directly as part of the
government’s budget constraint. This would be appropriate if money was
a kind of debt of the government so that, in fact, the government is under
the legal obligation to withdraw the money that is issued from the system.
For ”outside” money, which involves no obligation, this reasoning does not
apply.8
Following Woodford (2001), a ﬁscal policy is said to be Ricardian if it
satisﬁes the government budget for every vector of prices and interest rates.
It is said to be non-Ricardian if the budget is violated for some vector of
prices and interest rates. If (12) is in fact a part of the government’s budget
constraint, then it becomes clear that the balanced transfer rule is Ricardian,
where the ﬁxed transfer rule is non-Ricardian. In the following, we use these
8Note that, with outside money, the government also has to meet a budget constraint
in the terminal node: the government debt in the form of bonds must not be larger than
the tax returns, i.e. Bs ¡ ps ¢ ¿s · 0. However, this condition will never be a binding
restriction in our model. This is why we do not mention it explicitly in the text.
9expressions even though we do not interpret (12) as part of the government’s
budget constraint but as a necessary condition for every equilibrium.
2.4 Competitive equilibria























s; 8s 2 S; (16)
where the equation (13), (14), (15), and (16) are commodity, money and
asset market clearing conditions, respectively. We write the bond and risky
asset separately since we want to emphasize the diﬀerence of the market
supply in two cases.































(3) In every state, markets clear, i.e. (13)-(16) hold.
An equilibrium is said to be monetary if psl < +1, 8 s 2 S¤;l 2 L.
In the proofs of the theorems given in the following sections, we use
another equilibrium concept which is more tractable for our purposes. It is
well known that agent i’s maximization problem has a solution only if there
10is no arbitrage possibility on the ﬁnancial markets. Using the results from
Harrison and Kreps (1979), this implies the existence of a strictly positive
probability measure ¹ = f¹sgs2S such that qV =
¹
1+r0V . ¹ is called the
equivalent martingale measure.
























0 +As ¢µi +mi
0 +±iHs +ps ¢ei
s ¡p0 ¢¿i
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where m¤n := (ms ¢ ns)s2S¤. The left hand side is the expenditure in terms
of its date¡0 value, while the right hand side is the discounted nominal
wealth. For household 1, deﬁne the complete markets budget set









From the no-arbitrage conditions, the budget sets of agents i ¸ 2 can also be
expressed as depending on ¹ instead of q. Following Cass (1984) and Duﬃe
and Shafer (1985), in Deﬁnition 4 we deﬁne a concept of eﬀective monetary
equilibrium.



















. For i = 1, (x1;m1) maximizes u1(x1) such that


























9We use the notation 1 := (:::;1;:::).
11(3) In every state, commodity and money markets clear, i.e. (13)-(14) hold.
An eﬀective equilibrium is said to be monetary if psl < +1, 8 s 2 S¤;l 2 L.
From Deﬁnitions 3 and 4, we can immediately see two diﬀerences. First,
in the eﬀective equilibrium, household 1 is only restricted by the intertempo-
ral budget constraint and the cash-in-advance constraint. Second, household






directly. Instead he chooses a bond demand to
clear the bond markets and a demand for the risky assets to clear these asset
markets.
It is immediate that every eﬀective equilibrium corresponds to an equi-
librium as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3. Indeed, it is easy to see that the no-











as deﬁned in the eﬀective mon-
etary equilibrium corresponds to a monetary equilibrium, we ﬁrst need to
check that the household 1 satisﬁes the budget equations (4) - (8) and sec-
ond that his choice is still optimal in the sequential constraint. The ﬁrst
property follows directly from Walras law.10 To see that household one still
maximizes his utility, just notice that the sequential constraint is a subset of
the intertemporal one. Hence, the old consumption vector must be optimal
since it is still feasible under the sequential constraint and it was already op-
timal in the larger intertemporal constraint. These arguments are standard
and not made explicit here.
3 Monetary equilibria with balanced transfers
3.1 Interest rate peg
If the central bank pegs the nominal interest rate, then the vector r :=
frsgs2S¤ is ﬁxed at a target value r. To sustain r in the market, the central
bank accommodates money demand. We impose the following assumption
on monetary policy:
Assumption 5 Interest rates are nonnegative and bounded above, 0 · rs <
+1, 8s 2 S¤, and the government accommodates money demand, i.e. Ms = P
i mi
s for each s 2 S¤.
A monetary equilibrium with interest rate peg and balanced transfers
can now be deﬁned as follows:
10We leave it an exercise to the reader to check these equations.
12Deﬁnition 5 A monetary equilibrium with interest rate peg and balanced
transfers is a monetary equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 3 with exoge-
nously ﬁxed r satisfying Assumption 5 and a ﬁscal policy rule according to
Deﬁnition 1.
In the following theorem, we show that for every ﬁxed price level and for
every ﬁxed martingale measure, there exists a monetary equilibrium which
implements the interest rate target of the central bank.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 - 5 hold. Fix 0 < c < +1 and ¹ À 0,
then for every 0 · r ¿ +1 there exists a monetary equilibrium with interest















l2L;s2S ¹spsl and q =
¹
1+r0 A.
3.2 Money supply control
Under money supply control, the central bank ﬁxes the money supply pro-
cess M := (Ms)s2S¤ at a target value M. If this is the case, we impose
Assumption 6 Under money supply policy, 0 < Ms < +1, 8s 2 S¤.
Combining the balanced transfer policy with money supply control sug-
gests the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 6 A monetary equilibrium with money supply control and bal-
anced transfers is a monetary equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 3 with
exogenously ﬁxed M satisfying Assumption 6 and a ﬁscal policy rule ac-
cording to Deﬁnition 1.
In the next theorem we show that for every ﬁxed price level and for
every ﬁxed martingale measure, there exists a monetary equilibrium which
implements a money supply target M of the central bank. So the result
parallels the result from the previous theorem under interest rate peg policy.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 - 4 and 6 hold. Fix 0 < c < +1 and
¹ À 0, then for every 0 ¿ M ¿ +1 there exists a monetary equilibrium














l2L;s2S ¹spsl and q =
¹
1+r0 A.
133.3 Interpretation and literature
We provide some intuition for the existence and the indeterminacy results
in Theorems 1 and 2. To prove existence of an equilibrium we use similar
assumptions as in the GEI-model with nominal assets. The balanced trans-
fer rule implies that (12) is true both in and out of equilibrium. Hence this
condition is an identity which does not add additional restrictions as com-
pared to the standard GEI. Note that our equilibrium could be a no-trade
equilibrium in which there is no seigniorage income for the central bank. In
this case, the government just redistributes potential tax returns among the
households according to their shares (±i)i2I.
The intuition concerning indeterminacy can be given by counting equa-
tions and variables. The macro variables to be determined in the eﬀec-
tive equilibrium are the L(S + 1) commodity spot prices, the S ¡ 1 dimen-
sional equivalent martingale measure and the S+1 interest rates. There are
L(S + 1) equilibrium restrictions coming from commodity market clearing
and S + 1 money market clearing equations. Under interest rate peg, the
latter S + 1 equations are identities and the (S + 1) interest rates are ﬁxed
exogenously, hence both the equations and the variables cannot be counted.
Finally, there is a single Walras law at work. To see this, note that in every
eﬀective equilibrium, (9), (10) and (12) hold. From this, it is not hard to























From this equation and the fact that household one only faces the intertem-
poral budget constraint, we easily infer that one Walras Law is at work.
In total, there are S more variables than independent equations, so S is
the degree of total indeterminacy under both interest rate peg and money
supply control.11
11The same intuition can be given for the original economy. Under interest rate peg, the
macro variables to be determined are the commodity prices and the asset prices, which
is a L(S + 1) + (J ¡ 1)-dimensional vector. We have L(S + 1) + (J ¡ 1) market clearing
equations for the commodity and the asset markets and (S +1) market clearing equations
for the bond markets. Including the government budget constraint at every node s 2 S
¤,
it follows that there are S +1 Walras laws. The balanced transfer rule implies that (12) is
always true. From this, we infer another S degrees of redundancies. Hence, in total there
are S more variables than equations, which suggests an overall indeterminacy of degree S.
14Under interest rate peg, among the S dimensions of indeterminacy there
is (at least) one degree of homogeneity involved. Indeed, if agents react to
a doubling of the commodity prices by doubling their portfolios and money
demand, the transfers and money supply will also double by the balanced
transfer rule and money supply adjustment. Hence the allocation is unaf-
fected. In this case, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the remaining
S ¡1 degrees of indeterminacy which are captured by the measure are real.
An argument which supports this conjecture is given in Nakajima and Pole-
marchakis (2001).
However, the degree of homogeneity is lost in the case of money supply
control. Scaling the overall price level cannot be compensated by scaling
money demand accordingly since equilibrium money supply is ﬁxed. Hence
the indeterminacy captured by the price level might be real. Similarly, a
changing price level might change the endogenous transfers which could
also imply real eﬀects. Finally, as in the case of interest rate peg, the in-
determinacy captured by the measure might also be real because a similar
argument as under interest rate peg could apply under money supply control.
We conclude this short discussion about real indeterminacy by conjecturing
that the real indeterminacy of Ricardian equilibria with incomplete markets,
ﬁnancial assets paying in money and cash-in-advance constraints might be
diﬀerent under money supply control from the real indeterminacy with in-
complete markets and nominal assets.12 We emphasize that this is only a
conjecture which is worth to be considered formally in a separate paper.
The recent literature on Ricardian economies can be summarized as fol-
lows. Dr´ eze and Polemarchakis (2000) and Bloise, Dr´ eze and Polemarchakis
(2005) prove existence and indeterminacy under interest rate peg with com-
plete asset markets under a ﬁnite and an inﬁnite horizon, respectively. Bloise
(2006) shows similar results under an inﬁnite horizon with money supply
policy. We extend this recent literature on Ricardian economies by proving
existence and indeterminacy under both interest rate peg and money supply
policy with incomplete markets and a ﬁnite time horizon.
Notice that our results do not rely on the number of assets. Hence, the
same intuition as given above applies for the case of complete markets. This
Under money supply control, there are S + 1 more variables and equations which clearly
leaves the conclusion unaﬀected.
12The degree of real indeterminacy of the latter economy was studied by Geanakoplos
and Mas-Colell (1989) and Balasko and Cass (1989).
15is why Bloise, Dr´ eze and Polemarchakis (2005) and Dr´ eze and Polemarchakis
(2000) get basically the same results in terms of indeterminacy.
Under interest rate peg policy, Gourdel and Triki (2005) independently
studied a closely related economy. They obtained a result similar to our The-
orem 1. Within the interest rate peg policy, there are two major diﬀerences
between Gourdel and Triki (2005) and our model. First, in our model the
asset markets open before the commodity markets, as in Woodford (1994)
and Bloise, Dr´ eze and Polemarchakis (2005). In Gourdel and Triki (2005),
the bond market opens before the commodity market, but the latter opens
before the markets for the risky assets. Second, we use diﬀerent techniques
to prove our results. In our proof we use a trick introduced by Cass (1984),
while they use the method similar to Werner (1985). Our method leads us
to characterize the indeterminacy in terms of the total price level and the
equivalent martingale measure, while they use the price level within each
state as the indeterminate variables.
4 Monetary equilibria with ﬁxed transfers
In every equilibrium with ﬁxed transfer, (12) must be true. Plug (12) as a
function of Bs and (9) as a function of B0 into equation (10) to get
rs
1 + rs
Ms + r0M0 +
ps ¢ ¿s
1 + rs
+ p0 ¢ ¿0 = (1 + r0)H0 + Hs; 8s 2 S: (20)
This equation is a necessary condition for an equilibrium under ﬁxed trans-
fers. Notice that it can only be satisﬁed if either taxes or seigniorage are
strictly positive. Under zero taxes, the gains to trade in the economy must
hence be large enough to induce some positive seigniorage income for the
government.
In the proof of the next two Theorems we will impose a gains to trade
hypothesis which goes back to Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992, 2003(a),





³sl if ³sl < 0
³sl
1+° otherwise:
A feasible allocation (x¡s;es) := (x0;x1;:::;xS)jxs=es is said to be °-Pareto
optimal in state s 2 S at es if there does not exist a trade vector ³s 2 RIL in
state s such that
P
i ³i
s = 0 and, 8i 2 I, ei
s + ³i










S) with at least one i 2 I where
the strict inequality holds. If (x¡s;es) is °-Pareto optimal in state s 2 S at
es, then we equivalently say that there are no gains to °-diminished trade in
s 2 S at (x¡s;es). Accordingly, the gains to trade at (x¡s;es) are deﬁned
by
°s(x¡s;es) := minf° jthere are no gains to °-diminished trade in s 2 Sg:
4.1 Interest rate peg
In the ﬁxed transfer case, we assume that the interest rates are strictly
positive.
Assumption 7 Interest rates are strictly positive and bounded above, 0 <




s for each s 2 S¤.
Combining an interest rate peg policy of the central bank with the ﬁxed
transfer ﬁscal policy suggests the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 7 A monetary equilibrium with interest rate peg and ﬁxed trans-
fers is a monetary equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 3 with exogenously
ﬁxed interest rates according to Assumption 7 and a ﬁscal policy rule ac-
cording to Deﬁnition 2.
To rule out an exploding commodity price path, we need to impose either
a strictly positive taxation or a gains to trade hypothesis. The following
assumption says that if the tax in some state s 2 S is zero, then the gains to
trade in this state exceed the interest rate. Intuitively, the friction caused
by the transactions technology still allows for Pareto-improvements at the
initial endowment allocation in the state s 2 S.
Assumption 8 For every s 2 S, either ¿s > 0, or °s(x¡s;es) > rs for all
feasible (x¡s;es).
The following theorem states that every interest rate target of the central
bank can be embedded in an equilibrium with ﬁxed transfers. Note that we
do not claim any indeterminacy result here.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 4, 7 and 8 hold. For every












174.2 Money supply control
The deﬁnition of equilibrium is straightforward:
Deﬁnition 8 A monetary Equilibrium with money supply control and ﬁxed
transfers is a monetary equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 3 with exoge-
nously ﬁxed money supply satisfying Assumption 6 and a ﬁscal policy rule
according to Deﬁnition 2.
For the same reason as in the interest rate peg, we also need to impose
a Gains-to-Trade hypothesis for money supply policy.
Assumption 9 For every s 2 S, either ¿s > 0, or, for every feasible
(x¡s;es), °s(x¡s;es) > H0+Hs
Ms¡H0¡Hs together with M0 ¸ H0 and Ms >
H0 + Hs.
The last theorem states the parallel result of Theorem 3 for the case of
money supply control of the central bank.
Theorem 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 - 4, 6 and 9 hold. For every 0 ¿












4.3 Interpretation and literature
An intuition for Theorems 3 and 4 can again be given by counting equa-
tions and unknowns. As argued in Section 3.3 for the Ricardian economy,
we have one Walras law in every eﬀective equilibrium. However, (12) repre-
sents another S equilibrium restrictions in the ﬁxed transfer case. In total,
commodity prices plus the interest rates plus the martingale measure consti-
tute L(S+1)+(S+1)+(S¡1) variables which have to be determined. The
commodity and money market clearing conditions plus the S restrictions
from (12) minus the single Walras law add up to L(S +1)+(S +1)+S ¡1
equilibrium restrictions. Under interest rate peg, both the money market
clearing equations and the interest rates can not be counted. Hence, under
interest rate peg and under money supply control, the number of unknowns
and restrictions coincides. This is the intuition for why we do not ﬁnd some
degree of indeterminacy here.13
13The same logic as in Footnote 9 can be applied for the intuition in the original economy.
The diﬀerence to the argument given in Footnote 9 is that the ﬁxed transfer policy does
not imply another S degrees of redundancies in the terminal nodes. Hence, the number
of equations now coincides with the number of unknowns.
18This conclusion follows from the assumption that the government only
trades riskfree bonds and the fact that the transfers are ﬁxed. Intuitively, the
ﬁxed transfers always impose some restrictions, only the number of restric-
tions depends on the set of assets the government trades. Our assumption
that it only trades riskfree assets implies that it enters period one with state
independent debt. To allow for budget balance, taxes and seigniorage must
also be independent of the state. Since there are S states, this provides the
intuition why there are S additional restrictions. Now suppose there is a full
set of Arrow securities and that the government trades every such security.
Then there is only one additional restriction compared to the Ricardian case.
Indeed, in this case the only restriction is given directly by (19) because of
the exogenous transfers (see Bloise, Dr´ eze and Polemarchakis (2005)).
The main contributions to the theoretical literature14 in economies with
non-Ricardian ﬁscal policies and an active monetary policy are Dubey and
Geanakoplos (1992, 2003a, 2003b, 2006). Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992,
2003a) consider a one period model with a cash-in-advance constraint, inside
and outside money. Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b) extend this model
to a stochastic economy with incomplete asset markets and a mixed asset
structure. In all papers, they show, among several other results, existence
of the equilibrium. They do so by using a strategic market game approach.
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006) formally prove generic local uniqueness in
the stochastic economy with incomplete asset markets and nominal assets.
We study a similar economy as Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b, 2006),
but to prove existence we basically follow the ideas in Bloise, Dr´ eze and
Polemarchakis (2005) by introducing a price determination mechanism in
the ﬁxed point mapping for every price object. This allows us to estab-
lish a uniﬁed framework to prove existence of equilibrium in all four cases
we consider. In addition, by embedding each equilibrium object into the
ﬁxed point mapping, we provide a clear intuition for the mechanism which
determines the equilibrium.
Gourdel and Triki (2005) provide a result similar to our Theorem 3 under
interest rate peg policy. In addition to the diﬀerences mentioned in Section
3.3, there is one more major distinction in this case. While Gourdel and Triki
(2005) need strictly positive taxes to establish the existence of a monetary
equilibrium, our result also allows for the possibility of zero taxes provided
14As opposed to the quite huge macroeconomic literature on the Fiscal Theory of the
Price Level.
19that the economy has suﬃciently high gains to trade.
5 Concluding remarks
To conclude the paper, we discuss some directions of future research. First,
a diﬀerent timing of transactions can be considered. One possibility is to use
the cash-in-advance constraint as introduced by Svensson (1985), where the
commodity markets open before the asset markets. This could be a suitable
framework to study both the transaction and precautionary demand for
money. However, diﬀerent from our two-period model, the new timing needs
an inﬁnite horizon to support money’s value. Second, it would be interesting
to introduce a Baumol-Tobin structure in which households voluntarily hold
money as a store of value even though other interest bearing bonds coexist.
Both existence and determinacy in the Baumol-Tobin economy are open and
diﬃcult questions. Doing so probably requires more than two periods to
enrich the potential transaction patterns. In particular, an inﬁnite horizon
model would be of interest. Finally, the model presented here delivers a
uniﬁed framework for monetary and ﬁscal policy within a GEI-economy.
Therefore, it would be of interest to study the general equilibrium eﬀects of
changing monetary policy parameters. Under incomplete ﬁnancial market
the eﬀect can be expected to be real, an important feature for policy analysis.
Such an analysis would contribute to the old but fundamental debate about
the neutrality of money.
6 Appendix
In this appendix we give the proof for the theorems in the main text. The
proofs are organized as follows. First, we deﬁne an abstract economy. Sec-
ond, we show the properties of the household and aggregate demand. Then
we prove the results under diﬀerent monetary-ﬁscal policy combinations.
6.1 An abstract economy
Deﬁne the inverse price level as c := 1 P
l p0l+
P
s2S;l ¹spsl and the new prices

















20Multiply (4) with c and use the no-arbitrage equation q = 1








0 + ¹ ¢ A ¢ e µi
´
+ e mi




0, e µi := cµi, e mi
0 := cmi
0 and e H0 := cH0. The cash-in-advance
constraint in t = 0 is
e mi

















0 + As ¢ e µi + e mi









s and e Hs := c¹sHs. The cash-in-advance
constraint at state s 2 S becomes
e mi







and the terminal condition is
e bi
s + e mi
s ¡ ¼s ¢ ¿i
s = 0: (25)












+ £RS+1 £RJ¡1 ¯ ¯
(21) ¡ (25) hold
o
:























































¯ ¯(22),(24) and (26) hold
o
:
It is easy to understand that (9), (10) and (12) are equivalent to (20). With
the obvious deﬁnitions, equation (20) becomes in the abstract economy
rs
1 + rs
f Ms + ¹sr0f M0 +
¼s ¢ ¿s
1 + rs
+ ¹s¼0 ¢ ¿0 = (1 + r0)¹s e H0 + e Hs; 8s 2 S:(27)
21The arguments we used to derive (26) can also be used to derive an in-




















= e H0 +
e H1 ¢ 1
1 + r0
: (28)











f M; e B; e H
´o
such that markets clear, households optimize,












to Deﬁnition 4. As argued earlier, the latter vector corresponds to a mone-
tary equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 3. In the following proofs, we will
therefore concentrate on equilibria in the abstract economy.
6.2 The household and market demand
¹ is an element of the S-dimensional unit simplex, which we denote with
∆S¡1. The extended positive real line is as usual R+ := R+ [ f+1g. We
start by deriving the properties of the budget sets in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the budget sets satisfy the following
properties:

































2 interior(∆) £ ∆S¡1 £ RS+1
+ £ RS+1
+ .





















































































(1:1) To check non-emptiness, it is suﬃcient to notice that
³
xi; e mi;e bi; e µi
´
=
(0;¼ ¤ei;0;0) satisﬁes the equations (21)¡(25). Upper hemi-continuity
is straightforward.








must satisfy (26), which implies 0 · (xi; e mi) ¿ +1. From (25) we
know that e bi
s > ¡1 for every s 2 S. From the standard no-arbitrage





¿ +1. From (23) this further
implies that e bi
s < +1.
(1:3) To see that there is an interior point, take e µi = 0 and for every s 2 S¤
take xi
s = 0, e bi
s = ¡2²i
s and e mi





s > 0. Using
Assumption 3, ¼ À 0 and r ¿ +1, it is easy to see that (21) - (25)
hold with a strict inequality for all ²i
s small enough. Note that this
is true even if ¹s = 0 for some s 2 S. This sequence shows that the
interior of the budget set is nonempty. It is now easy to see that the
interior is lower hemi-continuous. Since the closure of a lower hemi-
continuous set is again lower hemi-continuous, the result follows.
(1:4) We only need to check that there is an interior point. Change the
sequence deﬁned in (1.3) by e bi
s = 0 for every s 2 S¤, e mi
0 = ¼0¢ei
0+ ±i e H0
2
and e mi
s = ¼s ¢ ei
s + ¹s
±i e H0
4 for every s 2 S to see that this is true.









0 > 0 and in period one take e bi
s = 0 and
e mi





2 to see that the interior is nonempty for ²i
0
small enough.
(1:6) It holds that
¡
x1; e m1¢









is non-empty. The second part is straightforward.
(1:7) This property follows immediately.




is nonempty, take ˜ m1
s = ¼s ¢
e1
s + ²s for every s 2 S¤, x1 = 0 and choose all ²s > 0 small enough.
Note that this argument relies on Assumption 3 and r ¿ +1.
(1:9) Under the assumption e H0 > 0, the same sequence as in (1.8) is an
interior point for ²i
s small enough for every s 2 S¤.
(1:10) Since e H1 > 0 and r0 < +1, the same argument as in (1.8) applies. ¥
The demand correspondence for every consumer type i ¸ 2 is deﬁned to
be
(xi; e mi;e bi; e µi)(¼;¹;r; e H):=
n³




(xi; e mi;e bi; e µi)2argmaxui(xi)
o
Let 'i(¼;¹;r; e H) denote the projection of this demand set onto (xi; e mi),
'i
x(¼;¹;r; e H) the projection of the latter onto xi and 'i
e m(¼;¹;r; e H) the
projection onto e mi. Household i = 1 maximizes his utility by choosing









and the projections are deﬁned as above. We summarize the
properties of individual demand in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 - 3, household demand satisﬁes the fol-
lowing properties:









2 interior(∆) £ interior(∆S¡1) £ RS+1
++ £ RS+1
+ .




is upper hemi-continuous under the condi-
















is upper hemi-continuous under the conditions given in
Lemma (1.8), (1.9) or (1.10).











if ¼sl ! 0 for some s 2 S¤ and l 2 L.
(2.6) 8s 2 S¤, if rs > 0, then e mi
s · ¼s ¢ ei














(2.7) For every i ¸ 2, under the conditions of Lemma (1.4) it holds that if
r0 ! +1, then e mi
0 ! 0 for all (e mi
0; e mi







Under the conditions of Lemma (1.9), the same property is true for
i = 1 for every (e m1
0; e m1







(2.8) For every i ¸ 2, under the conditions of Lemma (1.5) it holds that if
there is a s0 2 S with rs0 ! +1, then e mi









. Under the conditions of
Lemma (1.10), the same property is true for i = 1 for every
(e m1
0; e m1







Proof: Parts (2.1) - (2.5) follow from standard arguments using the
results from Lemma 1. Since money is dominated as a store of value for a
strictly positive interest rate, e mi
s = ¼s ¢ (xi
s ¡ ei
s)¡;8s 2 S¤, 8i 2 I. This
implies (2.6). Concerning (2.7), we ﬁrst argue for i ¸ 2. For r0 ! +1 we
argue that the sequence of best responses converges to a (xi; e mi;e bi; e µi) such
that e mi
0 = 0. From Lemma (2.2), the demand set is upper hemi-continuous
along this sequence. We will argue that if e mi
0 > 0 in the limit, then the
household can increase his utility. Since the cash-in-advance constraint binds
in the case of positive interest rates, e mi
0 > 0 implies that he sells something
of his endowment. If he deviates by selling nothing and consuming what he
sold before, his utility increases. The revenue which he loses in period one
from not selling the endowment in period zero can be taken from buying
costless bonds. This deviation implies that e mi
0 > 0 cannot be the best
25response in the limit. For household i = 1, the same property is true. In



















































This equation reveals that household one earns zero from selling his endow-
ments in t = 0. Maximization thus implies selling no endowments. From
the cash-in-advance it follows that money demand is zero. Part (2.8) follows
from the same logic as part (2.7). ¥





























































and if (28) holds, then

























ze m1 ¡ f M1
´
= 0:




sl for r À 0 and all s 2 S¤.
Proof: Lemma (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4) follow directly from individual
demand (Lemma 2). Lemma (3.3) follows from adding up (26) over i 2 I
and using (28). ¥
266.3 Proof of Theorem 1
We ﬁx the martingale measure ¹ À 0 and the inverse price level c > 0
at the outset. The transfers are determined endogenously according to the
balanced transfer rule.
6.3.1 Preliminary deﬁnitions






















We slightly abuse the notation by denoting both the function and the image









2 ∆ £ RS+1
+ £ RS+1
+ .
6.3.2 Construction of a ﬁxed point mapping
To make the proof compatible with a zero interest rate, we start by deﬁning





rs if rs > 0
1
n if rs = 0:













∆n = interior(∆). Let Ke m be a compact





for all ¼ 2 ∆ and e H 2
RS+1









. Since rn À 0 for all ﬁnite n,
such a compact set exists by Lemma (3.4).15 Deﬁne a compact and convex













. Since e H is a bounded function and f M 2 Ke m,










compact and convex set Kn






for all ¼ 2 ∆n and
15Even though r depends on n, the set K e m does not depend on n by Lemma (3.4).
27H 2 K e H. Denote the product set with Kn := Kn
x £ Ke m. Note that only
Kn
x depends on n. Finally, deﬁne the mapping
fn : ∆n £ Ke m £ K e H £ Kn ¶ ∆n £ Ke m £ K e H £ Kn
by ³



































f M(¼; f M; e H;z) := ze m;
fn











The ﬁrst mapping is the price player’s objective function, the second map-
ping says that the government accommodates money demand, the third
mapping is the government transfer function and the last mapping is the
market demand.
From Lemma 3 we infer that fn(¼; f M; e H;z) is a non-empty, compact,
convex-valued and upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Kakutani Fixed
Point Theorem establishes the existence of a ﬁxed point
³
¼¤n; f M¤n; e H¤n;z¤n
´
.
6.3.3 The limit of the ﬁxed points is an equilibrium
Since
³
¼¤n; f M¤n; e H¤n;z¤n
´
is bounded for each n, we can choose a subse-
quence having a limit
³
¼¤; f M¤; e H¤;z¤
´
. ¼¤ is trivially bounded. By Lemma
(3.4), z¤
e m is also ﬁnite since zn
e m is bounded above by the aggregate endow-
ment for all n. By construction, f M¤ = z¤



















It follows from f M¤ = z¤












































28in the limit. Consequently, we have z¤
x ·
P
i ei, and z¤
x =
P
i ei if ¼¤ À 0.
However, from Lemma (2.5) we know that household one’s demand goes to
inﬁnity if some ¼¤
sl ! 0. Since aggregate excess demand is bounded below,
we get that kz¤
xk ! +1 if some ¼¤




that ¼¤ À 0 and z¤
x =
P




is upper hemi-continuous for






It is straightforward to see that the vector
³
¼¤; f M¤; e H¤;z¤
´
corresponds
to a monetary equilibrium in the abstract economy under interest rate peg
with balanced transfers.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we ﬁx an arbitrary inverse price level
c > 0 and an arbitrary martingale measure ¹ À 0.
6.4.1 Preliminary deﬁnitions












to individuals as in Section 6.3.1.
Since f M is ﬁxed here, we write e H (¼;r).
6.4.2 Construction of a ﬁxed point mapping
As before, we deﬁne ∆n :=
©
¼ 2 ∆j¼sl ¸ 1
n
ª




¤S+1 carrying the interest rates r. Let Ke m be a compact




for all ¼ 2 ∆n, r 2 Ωn and
e H 2 RS+1
+ . Deﬁne a set K e H such that K e H ¶ e H (¼;r) for all ¼ 2 ∆n and
r 2 Ωn. Deﬁne the compact and convex set Kn






for all ¼ 2 ∆n, r 2 Ωn and e H 2 RS+1
+ . The product set is Kn := Kn
x £ Ke m.
As before, deﬁne the mapping












































































Again, all these mappings satisfy the assumptions required to apply









is bounded for each n, we can choose a subse-









¿ +1. Since e H (¼;r) is continuous, we know that e H¤ =
e H (¼¤;r¤). Hence it remains to show that markets clear and (r¤;z¤
x) ¿ +1.
Claim 1: In period zero, the money market clears and r¤
0 < +1. To
see this, we argue in three steps.
Step 1: We prove that z¤
e m0 · f M0. Suppose not, i.e. z¤
e m0 > f M0. From
the construction of fn
r , we must have r¤
0 = +1. Then it follows from the
deﬁnition of e H(¼¤;r¤) that e H¤
0 is strictly positive. Lemma (2.7) implies that
z¤
e m0 = 0, a contradiction to z¤
e m0 > f M¤
0 > 0. Hence z¤
e m0 · f M0.
Step 2: We prove that z¤
e m0 = f M0 if r¤






e m0 ¡ f M0
´
¸ 0 and z¤




e m0 ¡ f M0
´
· 0,




e m0 ¡ f M0
´
= 0. Therefore, r¤
0 > 0 implies z¤
e m0 ¡ f M0 = 0,
which means the money market clearing in period zero (with free disposal)
in the limit.
Step 3: We prove r¤
0 < +1. Suppose that r¤
0 = +1. From the ﬁrst
step, we know that z¤
e m0 = 0; from the second step, we know z¤
e m0 = f M0.
These two facts imply f M0 = 0, a contradiction. ¥
Claim 2: For every s 2 S, the money market in state s clears and
r¤
s < +1. To see this, we argue in several steps.








1. Indeed, using the

































e m1 ¡ f M1
´





e m0 ¡ f M0
´








e m1 ¡ f M1
´




















· 0. From the deﬁnition of fn










Step 2: The conditions of Lemma (2.5) apply. To see this, we argue that
either the conditions of Lemma (1.8) or the conditions of Lemma (1.10) are
satisﬁed. In fact, If r¤
1 ¿ +1, then the conditions of Lemma (1.8) apply
trivially. Alternatively, if there is some s 2 S with r¤
s = +1, then it follows
from the deﬁnition of e H(¼;r) that e H¤
1 > 0. Then the conditions of Lemma
(1.10) hold.
Step 3: We show that ¼¤ À 0. In fact, we saw in the previous step that
Lemma (2.5) can be applied. So if there is a s 2 S¤ and a l 2 L such that
¼¤
sl = 0, then Lemma (2.5) implies a contradiction to Step 1.
Step 4: Since r¤
0 < +1 and ¼¤ À 0, Lemma (2.8) applies. With this in
mind, it is easy to see that the Steps 1-3 of Claim 1 apply. Hence Claim 2
follows. ¥
From money market clearing it follows now by the same arguments as
in the proof of Theorem 1 that z¤
x =
P
i ei. From ¼¤ À 0 and the upper





corresponds to a monetary equilibrium in the
abstract economy with money supply control and balanced transfers.
6.5 Proof of Theorem 3
With ﬁxed nominal transfers we just introduce a transfer mapping which
transforms the original transfers into discounted real transfers. In addition,
we now determine c and ¹ endogenously in the ﬁxed point.
6.5.1 Preliminary deﬁnitions











+ if ¿s = 0
;







. Without loss of generality, if ¿s = 0 we can







31for all i 6= 1. It is easy to see that household 1 will have a non-empty budget








Deﬁne a government transfer function e H(c;¹) :=
³




e H0(c;¹) := cH0 and e Hs(c;¹) := c¹sHs; 8s 2 S:
This function is obviously a bounded and continuous function for ﬁnite c.
Next, deﬁne an inverse price level function cn by
cn (¼;ze m;¹;r) :=
r0
1+r0ze m0 + 1
1+r0
r1
















and use the shortcut cn (¼;ze m;¹) := cn (¼;ze m;¹;r). This is a bounded and
continuous function of (¼;ze m;¹) for each n as long as H0 > 0 and ze m ¿ +1.
Under the latter condition, deﬁne the bounded and continuous martingale-




s (¼;c;¹;ze m;r) :=
rs






















For ﬁxed r, we just write ¹n
s (¼;c;¹;ze m). By the construction of ¿n, as long
as ¼ À 0 we have cn > 0, ¹n
s > 0 and
PS
s=1 ¹n
s = 1 for all ﬁnite n.
6.5.2 Construction of a ﬁxed point mapping















for all ¼ 2 ∆, ¹ 2 ∆S¡1 and e H 2 RS+1
+ . Notice that Ke m
does not depend on n. As argued above, for positive H0 we can deﬁne a
compact and convex set Kn
c such that Kn
c ¶ cn (¼;ze m;¹) for all ¼ 2 ∆,
ze m 2 Ke m and ¹ 2 ∆S¡1. ¹n (¼;c;¹;ze m) lies in a compact and convex set
Kn
¹ ½ interior(∆S¡1) for ¼ 2 ∆n; ze m 2 Ke m and c 2 Kn
c . Introduce the set
Kn
e H such that Kn
e H ¶ e H(c;¹) for all c 2 Kn
c and ¹ 2 Kn
¹. This set can be
chosen to be compact and convex for every n since c 2 Kn
c . Further deﬁne
Kn






for all ¼ 2 ∆n, ¹ 2 Kn
¹ and e H 2 Kn
e H.
Finally, Kn := Kn
x £ Ke m. Deﬁne the mapping
fn : ∆n £ Kn
c £ Kn
¹ £ Kn
e H £ Kn ¶ ∆n £ Kn
c £ Kn
¹ £ Kn









































































is a non-empty, compact, convex-valued and upper hemi-
continuous correspondence. Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem establishes the





Note that the money market is always cleared since the central bank
accommodates money demand. From the construction of cn (¼;ze m;¹), in

















0 (1+r0)+ e H¤n
1 ¢1:
(29)
























































which proves that (27) holds.





is bounded for each n, we can let n ! +1










¿ +1, but z¤
x could be inﬁnite. Clearly, ¿n ! ¿. By











e m ¿ +1 we know that c¤ < +1. From this we infer e H¤ ¿ +1. It
remains to argue that markets clear, (27) holds, 0 ¿ (¼¤;c¤;¹¤), z¤
x ¿ +1





Given the construction of cn(¼; f M; e H), Lemma (3.3) applies for ev-
ery n. Together with money market clearing (the central bank accommo-








































Since the interest rates are always ﬁnite, Lemma (1.8) allows for the ap-
plication of the Lemmas (2.4) and (2.5). Hence, z¤
x =
P
i ei ¿ +1 and
¼¤ À 0.
From what we argued above, it follows easily that (27) is also true in




follows from ﬁnite interest rates and ¼¤ À 0
since Lemma (1.3) and Lemma (2.2) apply. Therefore, we need only to show
that c¤ > 0 and ¹¤ À 0.
We ﬁrst prove that ¹¤ À 0. Suppose ¹¤
s = 0 for s 2 S. From the
deﬁnition of ¹(¼; e m;c;¹) we get ze ms = 0 and ¿s = 0. For every n along the










s + (e bi¤n
0 + Ase µi¤n + e mi¤n
0 )¹¤n








s + e mi¤n
s = 0:


















0 + Ase µi¤n + e mi¤n
0 )¹¤n
s + ±i e H¤n
s :
By the cash-in-advance constraint, (xi¤
s ¡ ei
s)¡ = 0 for every i 2 I. Since
markets clear and nobody sells goods it follows that xi¤
s = ei
s for all i 2 I.
From e H(c;¹), we know that e H¤
s = 0. Hence we get (e bi¤
0 +Ase µi¤+ e mi¤
0 )¹¤
s = 0
from the budget constraint. For n ! 1, we get from the continuity of the











Deﬁne, for every i 2 I, the utility function vi : RL


































and a utility function ¯ vi
rs(³i
s) := vi(¯ ³s(³i
s;rs)). As argued in Dubey and

























. If we consider an economy with I agents having concave
utilities ¯ vi
rs(³i
s) and endowments ei
s, then no-trade is a Walrasian equilib-
rium for this economy at prices ¼¤. By Lemma 2 in Dubey and Geanako-
plos (2003(a)), at the initial endowment allocation (in state s 2 S) there
are no gains to rs-diminished trade. Hence, rs ¸ °s(x¤
¡s;es) from the deﬁ-
nition of °s(x¤
¡s;es) - a contradiction to the Gains-to-Trade Hypothesis in
Assumption 8. Therefore, we must have ¹¤
s > 0 for every s 2 S.
The deﬁnition of c(¼;ze m; e H) and ¹(¼;ze m;c; e H) now immediately imply
c¤ > 0.
It follows as before that the limit of the ﬁxed point vectors correspond
to a monetary equilibrium in the abstract economy with interest rate peg
and ﬁxed transfers.
6.6 Proof of Theorem 4
This proof is a combination of the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
6.6.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
The augmented taxation ¿n 2 R
(S+1)L
+ , the government transfer function
e H(c;¹) :=
³
e H0; e H1;:::; e HS
´
(c;¹), the inverse price level function
cn (¼;r;¹;ze m) and the martingale-measure function ¹n (¼;r;c;¹;ze m)
:= (¹n
1;:::;¹n
S)(¼;r;c;¹;ze m) are deﬁned as in Theorem 3. cn (¼;r;¹;ze m)
is a bounded and continuous function of (¼;r;¹;ze m) for each n as long as
H0 > 0 and ze m ¿ +1. Under the latter condition, ¹n (¼;r;c;¹;ze m) is also
35bounded and continuous. By the construction of ¿n, as long as ¼ À 0 we
have cn > 0, ¹n
s > 0 and
PS
s=1 ¹n
s = 1 for all ﬁnite n.
6.6.2 Construction of a ﬁxed point mapping









. Lemma (3.4) allows us to deﬁne the





for all ¼ 2 ∆,
¹ 2 ∆S¡1;r 2 Ωn and e H 2 RS+1
+ . As argued above, for positive H0 we
can deﬁne a compact and convex set Kn
c such that Kn
c ¶ cn (¼;r;¹;ze m)
for all ¼ 2 ∆n, r 2 Ωn, ¹ 2 ∆S¡1 and ze m 2 Ke m. ¹n (¼;r;c;¹;ze m) lies in
a compact and convex set Kn
¹ ½ interior(∆S¡1) for ¼ 2 ∆n; ze m 2 Ke m;
¹ 2 ∆S¡1, c 2 Kn
c ; and ze m 2 Ke m. Introduce the compact and convex set
Kn
e H such that Kn
e H ¶ e H(c;¹) for all c 2 Kn
c and ¹ 2 ∆. Further deﬁne
the compact and convex set Kn







¼ 2 ∆n;¹ 2 Kn
¹; r 2 Ωn, and e H 2 Kn
e H. Again, denote the product set by
Kn := Kn
x £ Ke m. Deﬁne the mapping
fn : ∆n £ Ωn £ Kn
c £ Kn
¹ £ Kn
e H £ Kn ¶ ∆n £ Ωn £ Kn
c £ Kn
¹ £ Kn











































































































366.6.3 The limit of the ﬁxed points is an equilibrium













for the abstract economy with taxation ¿.





























= H0(1 + r¤n































































































By the construction of fn



















































Ms ¡ H0 ¡ Hs
< +1: (30)
37From r ¿ +1 and the construction of fn


































e ms ¡ Ms
¶
= 0: (34)

















0 (1+r0)+ e H¤n
1 ¢1:
Adding up the intertemporal individual budget sets over all households and























The left hand side of this equation is just the commodity price players ob-























Given this, it is easy to see that the commodity markets clear. From Lemma





From the construction of cn (¼;r;¹;ze m), we know that c¤ < +1. Next,
we show that c¤ > 0 and ¹¤ À 0.
For ¹¤ À 0, the argument is quite similar to the one given in the Theorem
3. For every s 2 S, if ¿s > 0 , it is obvious that ¹¤
s > 0. Suppose ¿s = 0
for some s 2 S and ¹¤
s = 0. From the fact c¤ < +1, we know that
limn!1 c¤n¹¤n




e ms · Ms, we know
that z¤




e ms = +1 > Ms). Therefore, the
argument in the proof of Theorem 3 applies, which means °s(x¤
¡s;es) · r¤
s.
Hence, by (30), °s(x¤
¡s;es) < H0+Hs
Ms¡H0¡Hs, a contradiction to the Gains-to-
Trade hypothesis in Assumption 9. Therefore, we must have ¹¤
s > 0 for all
s 2 S.
38The result of c¤ > 0 can be proved in a similar way as in Theorem 3.
Given ¹¤ À 0 and c¤ > 0 we can now infer from equations (31) - (34)
that the money markets clear.
It follows that the limit of the ﬁxed point vectors corresponds to a mon-
etary equilibrium in the abstract economy with money supply control and
ﬁxed transfers.
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